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Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument
abstract:  Sydney Shoemaker has argued that, because we can imagine a
people who take themselves to survive a 'brain-state-transfer' procedure,
cerebrum transplant, or the like, we ought to conclude that we could survive
such a thing.  I claim that the argument faces two objections, and can be
defended only by depriving it any real interest.
1.
Imagine a society of beings like ourselves but more technologically
advanced.  They have a machine that records the entire state of a human
brain and imposes it onto another brain (destroying the first brain in the
process), creating a person psychologically indistinguishable from the
original.  These beings--call them the Progressives--often have this done
because high levels of radiation in their environment would otherwise ruin
their health.  They use another machine to make duplicates of themselves
with blank brains, which they keep in lead vaults for this purpose.
The Progressives take themselves to survive the 'brain-state-transfer'
procedure, and act accordingly.  They speak of what they themselves will do
after their next 'body-change', and of what they did before the previous one.
They hold people responsible for the actions of the person from whom they
inherited their brain state.  Their laws and customs reflect this:  the brain-
state recipient is entitled to the brain-state donor's property, is legally
married to the donor's spouse, is considered the parent of his or her
children, and so on.  Imagine further that the actual laws of nature operate,
and that there are no immaterial souls or the like.  The Progressives know
this, and know all the relevant physical facts about how the transfer
procedure works.
According to Sydney Shoemaker, this story suggests that we could
literally move from one human being to another by having our brain state
'transferred'.  He writes,
There is no clear sense in which [the Progressives] can be said to be
mistaken about a matter of fact in regarding the procedure as person-
preserving.  If we confronted such a society, there would, I think, be a
very strong case for saying that what they mean by "person" is such that
the BST-procedure is person-preserving (using "person" in their
sense)....But there would also be a strong reason for saying that what
they mean by 'person' is what we mean by it; they call the same things
persons, offer the same characterizations of what sorts of things persons
are, and attach the same kinds of social consequences to judgments of
personal identity--i.e., personal identity has with them the same
connections with moral responsibility, ownership of property, etc. as it
does with us.  But if they are right in thinking that the BST-procedure is
person-preserving, and if they mean the same by 'person' as we do, then
it seems that we ought to regard the BST-procedure as person-
preserving.?
I will call this the Radiation Argument.  Naturally radiation, or for that
matter brain-state transfer, is only an accidental feature of it.  Shoemaker
takes much the same argument to show that a person would go along with
his transplanted cerebrum (1999, 292-294).  Other variants are easily
imagined.
The argument has two main premises.  First, the Progressives are correct
in believing that they survive brain-state transfer.  More precisely, what they
mean by 'person' is such that 'persons' in that sense survive it.  I take this
to mean that the things they use their personal pronouns and proper names
to denote really do survive brain-state transfer.  Second, they mean the
same by 'person' as we do.  A Progressive who says, 'I am fifty years old,'
means the same as you and I mean when we say it.  I take this to imply that
the referents of their personal pronouns are the same beings, or at any rate
the same kind of beings, as the referents of our own pronouns.  Now if what
the Progressives mean by 'person' is such that persons in that sense really
do survive brain-state transfer, and they mean by 'person' what we mean by
it, so that we ourselves are persons in that sense, then it follows that we too
can survive brain-state transfer.  Hence, a liberal sort of psychological
continuity would be sufficient for us to persist through time, and physical or
spatio-temporal continuity would be unnecessary.  This would be an
important result, ruling out a wide range of alternative views about our
identity through time.
2.
What are we to make of this argument?  Perhaps the most obvious
question is why the Progressives couldn't be mistaken in believing that their
machine moves them from one human being to another.  If the argument is
to have any force, there must be some reason to suppose their belief to be
true other than the antecedent conviction that we ourselves, or persons in
general, could survive this.  Why should anyone unsure about whether we
could survive brain-state transfer agree that the Progressives could survive
it?  What principle lies behind the claim that, because the Progressives
understand how the procedure works, their belief that they survive it must
be true?
Presumably Shoemaker doesn't think that their belief is made true by the
mere fact that they hold it and act as if it were true.  A society can believe
virtually anything and act accordingly.  They might believe in a theistic god
and live sincerely religious lives.  Clearly that would not make it the case
that there was a theistic god.  Nor can we suppose that the Progressives'
believing that they survive brain-state transfer is strong evidence for their
surviving it.  We are given no reason to think that they are especially acute
metaphysicians.  The view, rather, is that there is somehow nothing for them
11984, 109f.; see also 1997, 299f.  For a similar argument, not involving radiation, see
Hirsch 1982, 290f.
to be mistaken about.  We could understand how they might be mistaken,
Shoemaker says, if their belief were based on the false assumption that the
machine transferred an immaterial soul.  But they are supposed to be 'under
no misconception concerning matters of fact' (1984, 109).
This is puzzling.  Isn't it a matter of fact whether someone whose brain is
altered in a certain way survives or perishes?  Either she does or she doesn't
(or it is indeterminate).  Whichever it is, anyone who thinks otherwise is
mistaken.  How could there be nothing to get wrong?  And if there is nothing
to get wrong, how could there be something to get right?
We could understand Shoemaker's claim if the Progressives' talk of
personal identity were not about numerical identity at all, but about some
other relation that uncontroversially holds in the relevant situations.
Suppose that what made it true to say that Martha went in for her brain-
state transfer yesterday and came out with a new body today was not that
any one being did both those things, but that the one who did the first
related in a certain way that did not imply numerical identity to the one who
did the second, and that a social convention made it appropriate to speak
and act as if beings related in that way were identical.  (Compare:  what
makes it true to say that the Prime Minister was a woman ten years ago and
is a man now is not that anyone changed sex, but only that a certain woman
of ten years ago relates in a way not implying identity--holding the same
political office--to a certain man of today.)  Then there would indeed be
nothing for the Progressives to be mistaken about, unless they are mistaken
about which beings did what when and whether they relate in that way.  The
way the Progressives think and act would suffice to put the relevant
convention in place, and claims made in accordance with it would be true.
But Shoemaker says explicitly that we are to take the Progressives'
statements to express numerical identity (1999, 393)--as they must if the
argument is to show anything about our numerical identity.
Or someone might say that there are rational, intelligent, self-conscious
beings that can survive brain-state transfer--'BST-survivors' for short.  In
fact there are as many BST-survivors as there are Progressives:  every
Progressive in some sense coincides with a BST-survivor.  In that case, the
Progessives' belief that they survive brain-state transfer could be false only
if their personal pronouns and proper names failed to denote BST-survivors.
But the way the Progressives think and act would surely suffice for their
pronouns to pick out BST-survivors if there are any to be picked out.  Hence
their belief, in the circumstances, would be true.
But if this is what Shoemaker is assuming (as it seems to be), he owes us
an argument for it.  Many respected philosophers doubt whether there are or
even could be BST-survivors.  If this doubt is intelligible, then we can
understand perfectly well how the Progressives could be mistaken in thinking
that they survive brain-state transfer:  there may simply be nothing in
heaven or on earth that could survive such a thing.
Perhaps the Radiation Argument is simply directed at those who already
accept the existence of BST-survivors.  (They are not rare.)  Every
argument needs premises, and no argument will persuade everyone.
But this would deprive the argument of any real interest.  Anyone who
believes in the existence of BST-survivors will almost certainly already
believe that our identity consists in psychological continuity of the sort that
obtains in the brain-state-transfer case.  No one ever thought that, although
there are BST-survivors, we are not those things.  For an argument to have
any persuasive force, it must give those who don't yet accept its conclusion
a reason to do so.  But there is unlikely to be anyone who, before
encountering the Radiation Argument, found its hidden premise more
probable than its conclusion.  So it looks like no one has any use for
Shoemaker's argument.
3.
Perhaps, somewhere, there are philosophers in need of the Radiation
Argument.  Or perhaps the first premise, that the Progressives are not
mistaken, can be defended in another way.  In any case, the argument faces
a second problem, independent of the first.  If the Progressives' beliefs
about what they can survive must be true, then presumably the same goes
for other imaginary societies who hold beliefs about survival inconsistent
with theirs.  And if what those other societies believe about themselves must
hold for us as well, we get a conclusion inconsistent with Shoemaker's.
Imagine a second society with the same marvellous technology as the
first.  They too occasionally have their brain state 'transferred' to another
head.  But they do not take themselves to survive this.  They see it as a way
of committing suicide--though a nobler and less selfish way of doing so than
the usual method, as it typically results in someone willing and able to look
after the dead person's affairs.  Those who submit to the procedure take
tearful leave of their loved ones and expect never to see them again.  No
one speaks of what he will do after his next body-change, or what he did
before his last one.  The recipient of a person's brain state is never held
responsible for the donor's actions, does not incur his debts, is not
considered married to his spouse, is called by another name, and so on.
Imagine further that these beings--call them the Conservatives--are subject
to the same laws of nature as we are, and have no false beliefs about how
the device works.
If we take the Radiation Argument as our model, it seems we must
conclude that the Conservatives are correct in believing that they don't
survive brain-state transfer.  More precisely, what they mean by 'person' is
such that brain-state transfer is not person-preserving.  The things they call
persons and use their personal pronouns to denote do not and could not
survive such a thing.  You might think that the Conservatives and
Progressives don't really disagree, but simply mean different things by
'person'.  But this is hard to accept given that the Progressives mean by
'person' what we mean.  That, Shoemaker said, was because 'they call the
same things persons, offer the same characterizations of what sorts of
things persons are, and attach the same kinds of social consequences to
judgments of personal identity--i.e., personal identity has with them the
same connections with moral responsibility, ownership of property, etc. as it
does with us' (1984, 110).  This holds equally for the Conservatives.  Hence,
Shoemaker's reasoning suggests that the Conservatives' personal pronouns
refer to the same beings, or at any rate the same kind of beings, as our own.
But now the trouble is only too plain.  If the things the Conservatives call
persons really cannot survive brain-state transfer, and they are precisely the
things we call persons, then it follows that we too cannot survive brain-state
transfer.  So the sort of mental continuity that obtains in brain-state
transfer is not sufficient for us to persist--contrary to the conclusion of the
Radiation Argument.  And since either argument would appear to be sound if
the other is, both must fail.
Someone might avoid the conflict by saying that what we mean by
'person' is indeterminate as between what the Progressives mean and what
the Conservatives mean.  Our concept of a person is not precise enough to
determine whether we could survive brain-state transfer.  I suppose this
means that the way we use our personal pronouns and other expressions
does not determine whether they refer to BST-survivors or to rational beings
that could not survive brain-state transfer (rational human animals, for
instance).  But this would not support the Radiation Argument.  It contradicts
the argument's second premise, that we mean the same by 'person' as the
Progressives mean.  Worse, it would make it indeterminate whether 'we'
could survive brain-state transfer, whereas the conclusion was meant to be
that we could definitely survive it.
To defend the Radiation Argument, we must show that the parallel
argument commits some fallacy that the original argument avoids.  Perhaps
the Conservatives could be mistaken about whether they survive brain-state
transfer in a way that the Progressives could not be:  although there is
nothing for the Progressives to be mistaken about, there is somehow room
for the Conservatives to get it wrong.  Or there may be reason to think that
the Conservatives, despite appearances, don't mean by 'person' what we
mean by it, a reason that somehow doesn't apply to the Progressives.  But
the only ground I can see for either claim is the antecedent conviction that,
although there are BST-survivors, there are no rational beings that cannot
survive brain-state transfer, or, alternatively, that what we mean by 'person'
implies that we could survive brain-state transfer.  And to suppose such a
thing at the outset would be to assume the point at issue.
Or someone might think that the second story is impossible or
unintelligible in a way that the original is not.  In some ways the
Conservatives may be harder to imagine than the Progressives.  The beings
who resulted from brain-state transfer in my story would be in the odd
position of apparently remembering all and only the past experiences of what
they took to be someone else.  They would tend to feel responsible for what
they thought were someone else's acts.  Their relations with their
predecessors' friends and relatives might be awkward.  (Imagine trying to
persuade a child who resulted from the procedure that she is not the person
she thinks she is.)  And so on.
This hardly suggests that the Conservatives are psychologically
impossible, especially if we are willing to grant the possibility of brain-state
transfer or cerebrum transplant.  At best one might argue that, because the
Conservatives are harder to imagine than the Progressives, the Progressives
are right to think that they survive brain-state transfer while the
Conservatives are mistaken to think that they don't.  But then Shoemaker's
argument would come to little more than this:  In a certain frame of mind
(trying to imagine what it would be like), we find it easier to believe that we
could survive brain-state transfer than to believe the contrary; therefore we
could survive it.  This may have some force, though It also faces well-known
difficulties (in other frames of mind--in listening to an entertaining story, for
instance--we find it easy to accept all sorts of things whose possibility would
otherwise be doubtful).  Whatever its merits, though, this is hardly the
substantial new argument Shoemaker appeared to be giving.
I conclude that the Radiation Argument provides no new reason to
suppose that we could survive brain-state transfer, cerebrum transplant, or
anything else.?
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